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Abstract  
This article is intended to generate a discussion about religious 
fundamentalism. We begin by proposing a definition and arguing for the 
value of ‘fundamentalism’ as an analytical category that allows the 
understanding of common political discourses, interventions and practices 
across different religions and diverse contexts.  We then delineate key 
components of fundamentalist movements, looking in particular at the 
construction of a neo-patriarchal political order as a key objective.  
We then move to trying to understand why fundamentalism has emerged at 
this particular point in time.  We argue that the weakening of a commitment 
to a secular politics has occurred through the convergence of several related 
factors.  Firstly we see the crisis of both ‘progressive’ versions of nationalism 
as well as of the political Left (locally and internationally) as having provided 
a major opportunity for religious fundamentalism, which it has adeptly 
occupied.  Secondly fundamentalists have interpolated the massively 
disruptive social changes caused by neoliberal globalisation taking place 
particularly but not exclusively in the developing world.  Thirdly we see 
intellectual understanding of the fundamentalist threat to human rights and 
women’s rights in particular has been significantly impeded by the rise of 
postmodernism and postcolonialism where the romanticisation of 
essentialised ‘other-identity’ claims has prevented the development of a 
critique of the fundamentalist agenda. 
Keywords: Fundamentalism, Feminism, Secularism, Postcolonialism, 
Neoliberalism 
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Introduction 
In the state of Borno in North-Eastern Nigeria, an internally displaced 
person offered the following harrowing account of what took place when 
members of the group Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lida'awati wal Jihad (JAS), 
commonly known as Boko Haram, arrived at their village: 
In the town of Damaskin Bama LGA…all school age girls and boys were 
reportedly placed in a large compound where they received systematic 
and intensive religious instruction. Initially, parents were pleased that 
their children were being taught the Quran, but in December 2015, 300 
children disappeared from the compound. Furthermore, though 
interviews with children who had received religious instruction 
demonstrated a continuity in the subject matter taught by previous 
Quranic teachers, there was one important difference: JAS’s instruction 
included injunctions to use violence against anyone opposing the 
teachings that they received, including their own parents (Ladbury, S et 
al 2016:5). 
     In Leamington Spa, Warwickshire, UK in September 2016 a wedding 
ceremony took place: an interfaith marriage, between a Sikh bride and non-
Sikh groom at the Warwick and Leamington Gurdwara.  However the event 
was severely disrupted when 55 members of Sikh Youth UK arrived to stage 
a protest in opposition to actions of the Gurdwara committee who had 
allowed this ceremony to take place.  As the protestors were wearing Sikh 
kirpans, a ceremonial dagger worn traditionally by Sikhs, the police were 
called and the protesters removed.  According to Shamsher Singh, a 
member of the Sikh Youth group which organised the protest, their 
objection was not against inter-faith marriage as such, but the protestors 
‘justifiably objected to an interfaith marriage that was to be carried out as a 
Sikh religious ceremony.’  He situated the protest in a context of ‘more and 
more young people are becoming interested in the true interpretation of 
what it means to be Sikh…The elder generation arrived [in the UK] and fitted 
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their faith round the need to assimilate, survive and to get work…Now 
younger people want to reclaim Sikhism as a deeply spiritual peaceful and 
encompassing religion and this is why we are seeing these protests.’ 
(Guardian, 12/11/16). 
These are two events which have taken place in two entirely different 
contexts, in different countries, involving two entirely separate religions, 
involving people with no connection to each other.  However the central 
point we want to make in this piece is that both of these events are 
significant signs of the times we are living in.  Without arguing for any sort 
of moral equivalence between these two situations described, what 
connects these instances is the way they manifest the resurgent power of 
religious fundamentalism.  Why is it that British Sikhs involved in protests 
like the one in Leamington are so preoccupied with interfaith marriages?   
Journalist Herpreet Kaur Grewal has expressed concern that in these 
protests the focus is always on Sikh girls marrying out while there is relative 
silence and inaction on caste discrimination and female foeticide 
(Independent 14/9/2016).   Sukhwant Dhaliwal has noted similarly that 
‘throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, the prohibition on mixed 
relationships manifested itself in regular reprisals between Sikh and Muslim 
gangs for targeting ‘their’ women. The question is, why has this resurfaced 
now?’ (Dhaliwal, 2016).  This central issue is the focus of this discussion.  
While the Islamic fundamentalism that characterises the first account 
is the most visible, our argument is that this is part of a development taking 
place within all major world religions.  While much of the condemnation 
that takes place around this focuses on this question of violence, it is crucial 
to see fundamentalism as about more than violence, even if violence 
remains one of its most defining qualities.  It is also important to see that 
the violence which characterises different forms of religious 
fundamentalism does not come out of the blue, but emerges over years as 
a consequence of the societal normalisation of fundamentalist thinking and 
teaching. Fundamentalism develops as process, and this sows the seeds of 
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
 
Cowden and Sahgal. Feminist Dissent, 2017 (2), pp. 7-38 10 
what develops into horrific events such as those in Nigeria (Ladbury, S et al 
2016).  While religious fundamentalism feeds off localised problems and 
grievances, we want to argue here that religious fundamentalist 
movements are, in the words of the Algerian sociologist Marieme Helie-
Lucas ‘political movements of the extreme right, which, in a context of 
globalization, e.g. forceful international economic exploitation and free-for-
all capitalism, manipulate religion, culture, or ethnicity, in order to achieve 
their political aims’ (Helie-Lucas, 2004).   In some instances this influence 
accumulates as fundamentalists have taken over the process of offering 
social support to working class and poor communities, particularly in a 
context of structural adjustment programmes and state withdrawal from 
social provision.1  Helie-Lucas describes similarly the rise of Islamist politics 
in the impoverished suburbs of French cities, noting that: 
the big strength of the fundamentalist far-right is that they understood 
very early that the state abandonment of its duties towards specific 
categories of citizens, and the decline of the old Communist Parties’ 
social activities in working-class areas of big cities, created a space for 
them, whether in [North Africa] or in Europe. “Political Islam” is a 
popular, and populist, movement. This…has been the fertile ground on 
which young men, and now young women too, become “radicalised”, 
thanks to the social work done by the Muslim far-right: the youth 
camps and sports clubs; the after-school tutoring; the sermons; the 
free distribution of clothing (including, of course, distributing so-called 
“Islamic dress” in the process); and books (including, of course, 
fundamentalist literature); the material help brought to homes where 
the bread winner just died; etc. (Helie-Lucas, 2015) 
As was argued in the first issue of Feminist Dissent, this is all part and 
parcel of the process whereby ‘fundamentalism has spread its tentacles 
even deeper into our social and political lives and spaces’ across the globe 
(Varma, Dhaliwal, and Nagarajan 2016: 4).  Without even attempting an 
exhaustive list of the contemporary conquest of political power by religious 
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fundamentalists it is crucial to refer to Bhariyata Janata Party (BJP) leader 
Narendra Modi, now India’s Prime Minister.  For many years the questions 
about his involvement in massacres of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 (Human 
Rights Watch 2002) led to him being treated as a pariah by western 
governments.  However as his regime now throws the India’s doors open to 
global capital, these questions alongside his ongoing involvement with the 
far-right, Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), whose 
policies openly admire European Nazism’s project of ‘racial purification’ 
(Bhatt, 2001), have become much less of a problem.  In the US it is no secret 
that Evangelical Christians have played a significant role in the election of 
Donald Trump in November 2016.  Trump himself is not an evangelical and 
anyone listening to the impious racist and misogynist demagogy during his 
campaign might have considered this might be off-putting to socially 
conservative religious people.  However as Mugambe Jouet (2016) has 
argued, the authoritarian black-and-white message, a message which 
characterises the form of religious fundamentalist ideology everywhere, is 
deeply appealing to evangelical fundamentalists in a country in which 42% 
of the population consider themselves ‘creationists’ (Jouet, 2016).  It is also 
crucial to note that while Trump is not religious, his Vice President Mike 
Pence has been a consistent supporter of ‘America First militarism, the 
criminalising of abortion and state-sponsored conversion therapy for LGBT 
people’ (Scahill, 2016).  These same evangelical Christian movements are 
also now developing in Central and South America, where fundamentalists 
are making substantial inroads both within and without the Catholic Church 
(Allen, 2016).  While the contexts are diverse, there is no mistaking the 
pervasive and powerful fundamentalist resurgence taking place across the 
globe.   
When we think about this it is also crucial to ask where are the 
progressive and secular forces in the face of this tide of reactionary 
mobilisation.  What has happened to the project of secular, social and in 
particular women’s emancipation?  Why is it that leading feminist and 
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socialist writers and intellectuals are so silent, so confused, or even 
supportive of the forces behind the fundamentalist grab for power?  We 
also feel it is important to ask why it is that we see – in the face of all the 
evidence of what religious fundamentalists stand for and the means by 
which they aim to achieve their agenda – a continued apologetics within 
leftist, feminist and human rights circles for religious fundamentalists?  For 
many on the left there is a reluctance to accept the legitimacy of the term 
‘fundamentalism’ as a way of understanding contemporary politics, 
reflected for example in the way the actions of Islamist groups in the UK are 
explained away as a reaction to the ‘Islamaphobia’ of the state.  The 
language of UK government policy is similarly nervous about the term 
fundamentalism and has hung their entire policy on the strangely 
ambiguous term ‘radicalisation’.  Counter-terrorism experts on the other 
hand focus on the distinction between ‘violent’ versus ‘non-violent 
extremism’.   If we have no language to talk about this issue, then we have 
no basis for analysis or action, and it is this silence that we hope to challenge 
in this discussion.  Our argument is structured into two parts.  We begin by 
seeking to define the category of ‘religious fundamentalism’ and argue for 
its centrality as a means of understanding the politics of the present.  We 
then ask ‘why now?’ Why is it now when it had been assumed by so many 
for so long that religion globally was a force in terminal decline in the face 
of the onward march of modernity, that we are now seeing this global 
fundamentalist conquest of power? We conclude by offering some 
perspectives for the future. 
What is Fundamentalism? 
‘God Almighty created men and women different, with differing needs and 
roles [and] scripture declares that God has called the Father to be the 
spiritual leader in his family…The hope of America today is strong Christian 
families.  Determine to make your family a fortress of spiritual and moral 
strength against the shifting tides of moral change’ 
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Reverend Jerry Falwell (in Marty & Appleby: 1993:131) 
‘Humanity today is living in a large brothel! One has only today to glance at 
its press, films, fashions shows, beauty contests, wine bars and broadcasting 
stations! Or observe the mad lust for naked flesh, provocative postures, and 
sick suggestive statements in literature, the arts and mass media!’ 
Sayid Qutb (in Ruthven, 2007:26)  
In 1910 Lyman and Milton Stewart, after having made their fortune in oil, 
funded the production of a book entitled The Fundamentals: A Testimony of 
Truth and the conservative editors who put the book together presented a 
series of arguments about the critical importance of a return to Biblical 
fundamentals’.  This was done through an assertion of the literal truth of 
the Bible, at the same time attacking Socialism, Modernism, Darwinian 
evolution, and the threat these posed to ‘family life’ (Various authors, 
1910). The term ‘religious fundamentalism’ was born.  In her book The 
Battle for God (2001) Karen Armstrong begins by asking whether a term 
originally developed within North American Protestantism in the early 20th 
century can be used to characterise the wide range of movements we now 
see within different faith and national contexts.  Bruce Lawrence has argued 
in his 1987 book Defenders of God: the Fundamentalist Revolt against the 
Modern Age that while these movements exist within Christian, Jewish and 
Islamic traditions, they can be collectively characterised as ‘fundamentalist’ 
on the basis of their common rejection of the legacy of Enlightenment 
reason and a corresponding belief in the ‘morally corrosive’ impact of 
modernity.  He argues that the Enlightenment and modernity, rather than 
being a specifically Christian or Western experience, have impacted on Jews 
and Judaism within Europe and on Islam through the colonisation of Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East (Lawrence, 1987).   
Chetan Bhatt in his study of two of the twentieth century’s classic 
fundamentalist movements within Hinduism and Islam – Hindutva and the 
Jamaat e Islami – has developed this argument further stating that it is 
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crucial ‘not to separate historically the impact of modernity outside the 
West with the identified and claimed features of modernity in the West, but 
to consider both as a persisting and discontinuous set of global 
transformations’ (1997:82).  He takes the claim that Islam or Hinduism were 
‘pure formations, hermetically sealed from contamination from the West’ 
as an instance of this interconnectedness, noting this claim is one made 
both by fundamentalists as well as by ‘orientalist’ conceptions of Western 
superiority. Bhatt argues that the very way these conceptions act as mirror 
images of each other – where an identical claim signifies positively in one 
conception but as sign of inferiority and backwardness in the latter - points 
to the way religious fundamentalism is itself a product of modernity 
(1997:79).  Bhatt notes that while Hindutva and the Jamaat e Islami 
emerged from different faith traditions, both developed in India in the first 
half of the twentieth century and appealed in very similar ways to the 
‘fundamental truths’ of the Vedas or the Qu’ran, rejecting secularism as 
‘Western’.  Yet these claims have been constructed entirely through the 
thoroughly modern conceptions of ‘race’ and Nation. In 1938 Madhav 
Golwalker (1906-1973), second Supreme Leader of Hindutva paramilitary 
group the Rashatriya Swayansevek Sangh (RSS), published a document 
entitled ‘We, or our Nationhood defined’.  In remarkably similar terms to 
German National Socialism of which he was a great admirer, Golwalker 
proclaimed ‘We will not seek to prove this axiomatic truth, that the Race is 
the body of the Nation, and that with its fall, the Nation ceases to exist’ (in 
Bhatt, 1997:204).  This combination of the ancient Vedic truths with a 
fascination with Nazism, of a ‘theocratic concept of politics and civil society’ 
with a ‘racial concept of the nation’ (Bhatt, 1997:205) is deeply illustrative 
of way religious fundamentalism occupies this curious double relationship 
with modernity; at once entirely a product of it, but seeking to reject it, all 
at the same time.  While the context of The Fundamentals: A Testimony of 
Truth was again different, all these developments are illustrations of what 
Malise Ruthven calls ‘family resemblances’ between the forms of religious 
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fundamentalism (Ruthven, 2007:6).  In understanding the essentially 
reactionary fundamentalist project and the way it arises out of religion, it is 
equally important to understand the way this is distinct from and often 
highly destructive of more mainstream historic forms of religious practice 
and belief, and we offer many instances of the way this happens in this 
discussion.   
What do fundamentalist movements mean when they talk of the need 
to return to ‘fundamental truths’? It is crucial to grasp that this is not about 
a return to a ‘lost tradition’ in a straightforward sense, not least because 
religious traditions historically are localised and very heterogeneous. As 
Yuval-Davis and Saghal have noted ‘there is no such thing as ‘strict 
adherence to the text’ [as] all great religious scriptures include internal 
contradictions’ (1992:4).  It is for this reason that religious fundamentalists 
construct ‘tradition’ in a way that is highly selective, at the same time as 
dogmatically insisting that their reconstructions of text are ‘sacred’ and so 
unable to be questioned.  The accounts offered are deeply reductive and 
simplistic, and often patently absurd - Bhatt offers the example of Hindu 
nationalists who demand ‘the restoration of an ancient Hindu empire that 
never actually existed’ (1987:91) - however the power these groups exercise 
through this is very real.  A crucial feature of fundamentalism’s essential 
authoritarianism lies it in the way it makes a claim for the absolute truth of 
these highly selective religious discourses.  In her outstanding account of 
contemporary Islamic fundamentalism Your Fatwa Is Not Welcome Here 
(2011), Karima Bennoune argues for the importance of the category of 
‘religious fundamentalism’ precisely because of its capacity to describe a 
series of related developments ‘across religious boundaries to 
contemporary movements within all the world’s great religious traditions – 
not just Islam, but also Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism’.  In similar terms to 
Bhatt, she characterises fundamentalist doctrine as operating by 
relentlessly denying ‘the possibility of interpretation and reinterpretation 
even while its adherents engage in both’ (2011:14-15).  
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In spite of the way fundamentalist movements claim to be recovering 
timeless sacred truths, both their ideology and methods are not atavistic, as 
demonstrated by the way religious dogma is promoted alongside an 
enthusiastic adoption of modern technologies in industry, communication 
or destructive weaponry.  In 1989 Khurshid Ahmed of the Jammat-i-Islaami 
urged the 18th Islamic Foreign Minister’s conference in Riyadh to ‘project 
the true image of Islam through the latest technology available’ (Bhatt, 
1997:117).  Shamsher Singh, one of the organisers of the 2016 Sikh protest 
in Leamington talks of a generation seeking a ‘deeper spiritual essence of 
Sikhism’, which one might think that to be concerned with a backward 
looking or other worldly mysticism.  But as Sukhwant Dhaliwal has noted, 
the basis of the protest involved the group filming their actions and then 
sharing these on social media, using this material ‘to publicly shame families 
already pushing against deeply conservative proscriptions. The film footage 
shows protestors referring to interfaith marriage…as ‘messed up’, stating 
that ‘Leamington is finished when we’ve got elders saying it’s alright to 
marry white people, black people’. (Dhaliwal, 2016).  This again illustrates 
the way fundamentalists seek to rewrite the diverse and contested nature 
of particular religious traditions and practice, presenting their ‘single 
version of collective identity as the only true, authentic and valid one, [using 
this] to impose their power and authority over ‘their’ constituency’  (Imam, 
Morgan & Yuval-Davis, 2004: x).   
In her discussion of Sikh fundamentalism Dhaliwal refers to the many 
lectures of Jagraj Singh on YouTube, where he asserts that ‘relationships or 
dating are not part of Sikhi, marriage is part of Sikhi’ (Dhaliwal, 2016); 
relationships outside marriage are thus presented as acts of uncontrolled 
lust, as opposed to ‘authentic’ marriages between two Sikhs.  These sorts of 
arguments point to a central and defining feature of religious 
fundamentalism; the attempt to control women’s bodies and sexuality 
within a patriarchal family order.  Marieme Helie-Lucas argues that while 
there are:  
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many forms and varieties of fundamentalism…one key element of their 
politics is the control of women. This is true of all religious 
fundamentalisms: we can see it with the Christian Right in the US 
promoting their views of ‘morality’ by assassinating medical personnel 
who perform abortions; it is true of Muslim Fundamentalists promoting 
gender apartheid in Iran, Sudan, Algeria, and Afghanistan; it is true of 
the Hindu BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and RSS promoting sati (Lucas 
2015). 
Patricia Madigan in her study of Fundamentalism within Islam and 
Catholicism argues that while ‘many studies of ‘fundamentalism’ have 
rightly diagnosed it as a reactive movement against the forces of modernity, 
few have recognised its essentially patriarchal character’ (2011:2). Madigan 
argues for an understanding of the ‘intrinsically patriarchal character of 
fundamentalism’ in which ‘by selectively retrieving doctrines, beliefs and 
practices’ from the past seeks ‘to shape a religious identity that will then 
become the basis of a recreated ‘neo-patriarchal’ social and political order’ 
(2011:21).  Both the quotes from Jerry Falwell and Sayid Qutb at the 
beginning of this section demonstrate the way it is the sexualised female 
body that acts as the central signifier of the morally debased and corrupt 
nature of modernity, and hence a central feature of religious 
fundamentalism lies in the assertion of control over women’s sexual and 
reproductive potential: ‘Woman, as an embodiment of sexuality, is to be 
owned and jealously controlled’ (Madigan, 2011:52).  Alongside this 
fundamentalist movements assert rigid boundaries between male and 
female behaviour in all areas through control of women’s dress and public 
behaviour while promoting amongst men a culture of ‘exaggerated 
masculinism, manifested by rituals of male bonding and by highlighting 
marks of male gender’ (Madigan, 2011:52).  It follows from this that 
fundamentalist movements are universally homophobic and hostile to LGBT 
sexuality and movements, as this is seen to transgress the rigid gender 
distinctions they obsessively police as part of their belief in a religiously 
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sanctified neo-patriarchalism.  Examples of this abound but one of recent 
note was Jerusalem’s Chief Rabbi Shlomo Amar who described LGBT people 
as an ‘abomination cult’, claiming that the Torah obligates them to be ‘put 
to death’ (Jerusalem online 17/11/16).  
We have already noted the distinction that must be made between 
religious fundamentalism and traditional forms of conservative religious 
piety. While traditional conservative religious values remain problematic 
from a gender perspective, they have been also protective of certain 
traditional spaces for women as well as being capable of reform and change. 
The kidnapping of children by JAS/Boko Haram described at the start of this 
piece is justified ‘in the name of Islam’; however the religious sanctification 
of kidnap, murder, rape and parricide was never proclaimed within 
traditional religious conservatism.    The Iranian Koranic scholar and writer 
Navid Kermani has described the Saudi sponsorship of the puritanical 
ideology of Wahhabism that is behind so much contemporary Islamist 
politics as a travesty of the ‘multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural 
Orient’: 
Sponsored with billions from the oil industry [this is] a school of thought 
that has been promoted for decades in mosques, in books and on 
television that declares all people from all other religions heretics, and 
reviles, terrorises, disparages and insults them…That such a religious 
fascism even became conceivable, that IS finds so many fighters and 
even more sympathisers… - that is not the beginning, but rather the 
end point of a long decline…of religious thought (2015:80-81)  
Wahhabism is just one instance of the ways fundamentalist movements 
assert their power though disciplining, repudiating and expelling those more 
tolerant, pluralist and hybrid elements within their own religious tradition, 
thereby seeking to ‘purify’ it.  It is for this reason that religious 
fundamentalists are often engaged in destroying traditional forms of 
religious practice and culture.  In Mali, a country with syncretic religious and 
musical traditions developed over centuries, it is now the case that, since a 
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fundamentalist takeover, many of its most popular musicians are unable to 
perform in public. Eyadou Ag Leche of the group Tinariwen has described a 
situation where, since the Islamists took power in the north of their country, 
‘young people have been stopped from listening to music and families have 
had their televisions smashed for watching music shows, but that music was 
still being played underground’ (Guardian, 15/1/2013).   The introduction of 
blasphemy laws has been another way religious fundamentalists have 
influenced state policy as a means of projecting their own sectarian view of 
religion and persecuting religious minorities that have lived alongside 
religious majorities for centuries.  The Asia Bibi case in Pakistan in 2009 is 
an example of this, where blasphemy laws were used to arrest and put on 
trial a young Christian farm worker following a village argument in which 
she was alleged to have made comments criticising the prophet 
Mohammed. While the evidence presented against her in the legal case was 
extremely weak, fundamentalist mobilisations around her trial created an 
atmosphere in which public officials dared not to throw the case out, and in 
2010 a Pakistani court sentenced her to death.  Two government ministers 
who took a stance against the absence of a fair trial and the injustice of the 
sentence - the Governor of Punjab Salmaan Taseer and Minority Affairs 
minister Shahbaz Bhatti – were subsequently assassinated by 
fundamentalists.  Asia Bibi herself has remained in prison for the last 6 years 
as the case continues to be heard (Guardian 11/10/2016).   
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http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/asia-bibis-unfair-trial/  
Fundamentalist violence against other religions other versions of the 
same religion are another part of the way fundamentalists seek to ‘purify’ 
religion, in the process destroying syncretic religious traditions that have 
developed over centuries by imposing fundamentalist versions of  religion 
that are often entirely foreign.  Marieme Helie-Lucas has noted this in 
relation to the so-called Islamic practice of Female Genital Mutilation.  This 
was ‘historically limited to the sphere of influence of Ancient Egypt’, but was 
exported by fundamentalists to Sri Lanka, to Tunisia, where it was 
‘previously unheard of’ and thence into ‘the Muslim enclave of Sanzak in 
Serbia’ (Helie-Lucas, 2015).   
Fundamentalism is thus a modern political movement that develops 
out of religion, using it to gain or consolidate power, but which also 
represents a breach from many historic and mainstream forms of religion. 
It is found in all major religions throughout the world, sometimes holding 
state power, sometimes in opposition to it — and sometimes working within 
the confines of a secular state to control minority communities. 
Fundamentalism is not the same as religious observance, which must be 
seen a matter of individual choice, and it is crucial to understand the way 
fundamentalists gain power by attacking those universalist and pluralist 
conceptions of faith which also exist in all major religions. As we have 
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argued, control of women’s minds and bodies is at the heart of the 
fundamentalist agenda and this is done through presenting them as 
upholders of the supposedly unchanging morals and traditions of the whole 
community.  Women who refuse this role may risk being demonised, 
outcast from their community, subjected to physical violence or even killed. 
This paradigm also promotes authoritarian belief centring on rigidly defined 
gender roles where extreme rewards and punishments are meted out; 
rapture or houris in Paradise for the faithful or hellfire for transgressors and 
dissidents. These notions are not regarded as metaphors but as literal 
descriptions of the world, predictions of soon-to-happen events. But the 
faithful are enjoined to create an earthly utopia as well. In this sense we 
need to understand the rise of fundamentalist movements in the context of 
the collapse of secular utopias, particularly communism and the progressive 
nationalist movements that arose in the era of decolonisation. 
Why Fundamentalism Now?  
‘We are that generation that has plucked the fruits of Reason’s pretensions 
to sovereignty…Reason idolises man; forgetfulness of God is the root of all 
social evil’ 
Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger (in Ruthven, 1994)  
In a recent discussion of the changing relationship between religion and 
politics the writer and academic Gilbert Achcar noted that as a young man 
growing up in Beirut in the 1960s he was ‘fully convinced that the progress 
of science and education would wipe out religion in the twenty first 
century’.  Reflecting back on this from the present he describes as ‘a sign of 
ideological regression of historic proportions’, the fact that one of the 
freedoms ‘most wanting and most threatened in the major parts of the 
world today is the actually the freedom not to worship any deity’. (2013:10-
11).  Indeed Achcar’s youthfully optimistic belief about the decline of 
religion was not unusual, but was widespread across the political spectrum 
- including amongst religious groupings themselves, many of which 
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reflected throughout the twentieth century on the nature of their 
contemporary role in the face of the onward march of reason and scientific 
rationality.  In 1917 the classical sociologist Max Weber developed the term 
‘disenchantment’ to describe the way modern industrialism, the logical 
methods of science and the depersonalised relationships fuelled by growing 
bureaucratisation of society had permanently destroyed the basis of a sense 
of the ‘sacred’ which had once permeated everyday life (Weber, 2005).  
However it is important to note that rather than celebrating this as a 
triumph of rational modernity, Weber noted that the very success of science 
in demonstrating that ‘one can, in principle, master all things by calculation’ 
(2005:322) created a concurrent yearning for meaning and purpose beyond 
rationality.  Is it the case then, as we now see the resurgence of 
fundamentalist movements, that we are seeing a kind of ‘disenchantment 
in reverse’?  This is a key question that we need to address if we are to 
understand the rise of fundamentalism at this particular moment in history.  
Gilles Kepel in his book on the re-emergence of religious fundamentalism 
argued that within the thinking of many leading religious thinkers, that 
around the mid-1970s: 
. . . a new religious approach took shape, aimed no longer at adapting to 
secular values but by recovering a sacred foundation for the 
organization of society, by changing society if necessary. Expressed in a 
multitude of ways, this approach advocated moving on from a modern-
ism that had failed, attributing its setbacks and dead ends to separation 
from God. The theme was no longer aggorniomento [accommodation] 
but a second evangelization of Europe; the aim was no longer to 
modernize Islam but to ‘Islamize modernity’. (Kepel, 2004: 2) 
Kepel argued that a key feature of these arguments was the sense of ‘crisis’ 
in society characterised as a consequence of the godless nature of 
modernity. The Catholic archbishop of Paris Jean-Marie Lustiger captures 
this in the quote above, expressing the view that the major cause of the 
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social ills and moral degradation of society is the setting free of reason from 
faith.  However for religious fundamentalist the solution to this is not a 
return to pre-modernity and in this sense they are not interested so much 
in ‘re-enchanting’ the world; they are rather ‘anti-modernist forms of 
modernity’ (Singh & Cowden, 2011) that have an affinity with white 
supremacist forms of fascism and extreme forms of ethnic nationalism.  
While they often emerge in relation to specific and localised grievances, 
their ascendancy needs to be understood against the backdrop of two much 
wider historical processes. The first of these is the power vacuum created 
through the decline and collapse of secular visions of a better world, be 
those socialist, communist or nationalist.  Secondly they represent a 
response and reaction to one of the most significant changes within 
capitalist modernity itself which is caused by the incorporation of women 
into the global labour market. 
Fundamentalism and the ‘end of history’ 
      When it came to religion, the revolutions in Russia and China in the early 
and mid twentieth century were based on a conception of communism 
which, following Marx’s work, saw itself as essentially an extension and 
development of the ideas of the Enlightenment.  In 1905 Lenin, while 
insisting on the right to religious belief as a private affair, equally wrote of 
the need to ‘translate and widely disseminate the literature of the 
eighteenth-century French Enlighteners and atheists’, arguing that  
communists must always ‘preach the scientific world-outlook’ (1981:10-11).  
Mao Zedong was more hostile still to religion, seeing this as a central plank 
of the oppressive social order in China.  Mao wrote of the four authorities 
of ‘political, family, religious and masculine’ power which acted as ‘the 
embodiment of the whole feudal-patriarchal ideology and system, and are 
the four thick ropes binding the Chinese people, particularly the peasants.’ 
(Selected Works, 1927). This approach was reflected not just in the 
development of powerful mass based Communist Parties, but also the ideas 
of Nasserism in Turkey, and the Ba’th and Arab socialism in the Middle East.   
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Sami Zubaida has argued that in this period that ‘religion played, for the 
most part, a subordinate role in the definition of identities and conflicts, 
though it may have been a more potent factor at a popular level’ (2015).  It 
is also important to note that while the leaders of these movements were 
politically secular in their approach, neither did they oppose religious 
identities as such.  As Partha Chatterjee has noted, many of nationalist 
movements sought to harness or control religion,  presenting it as a kind of 
cultural essence of ‘the people’ and in this way allowing it to act as both an 
alternative to, but also mimicry of, a western model of nationalism 
(Chatterjee, 1993).  
It is also important to note that while the nationalist and anticolonial 
movements in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia which emerged 
in the middle decades of the twentieth century were not necessarily or 
exclusively anti-religious, it is crucial to note that these anti-colonial 
struggles were conceived by their participants as emancipatory struggles.  
This is significant when it comes to understanding women’s demands both 
within and in the aftermath of anti-colonial struggles. Indian women fought 
against the Raj but also fought local government and state elections 
throughout the 1920s-30s, and with the achievement of independence 
there was universal suffrage for the first time.  The key focus of women’s 
political organisation at this time concerned the reform of personal laws; 
that is laws governing issues of marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption, 
rights of widows and guardianship.  While many important reforms were 
won through this activism, the implementation of these legal changes was 
constructed on a communal basis, hence the Hindu Code Bills passed in the 
1950s meant that the Hindu majority were reformed, while for other 
religious groups this same process did not take place.  This had the effect of 
reinforcing religious differences in a key area of law affecting women and as 
secular definitions of citizenship have weakened, this has been a key terrain 
in which fundamentalist groups have been able to argue for the 
reinforcement of the legal basis of religious distinctions.   
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Sami Zubaida has argued that with ‘the collapse of Nasirism after the 
1967 war with Israel and the evolution of the Ba’th in power into family 
dynasties in Iraq and Syria, as well as the weakening of the left, opened the 
field to ethnic and religious politics in the region. The Iranian Revolution of 
1979 gave a powerful impetus to this sacralisation of politics’ (2015).  The 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
which had given significant economic support to a range of secular regimes 
in different parts of the world, was hugely significant in this process. Francis 
Fukayama proclaimed the ‘end of history’ as a wave of profoundly 
destabilizing economic globalization, neo-liberal economic policies and 
Structural Adjustment Programmes promoted by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Bank 
swept the developing world (Westra, 2009).  The combination of the 
collapse of communism and the destructive impact of globalisation was 
significant in developing world not just because of the collapse of a secular 
ideal, but also because for developing countries it massively reduced the 
capacity of national governments to manoeuvre between the two 
superpowers.  It was this as much as anything that made it so much easier 
for the WTO, IMF and World Bank to gain so much control in this area. 
Fundamentalists have been able to position themselves as the 
beneficiaries of the anger, disillusionment and ‘anomie’ caused by this, and 
part of the traction fundamentalism gained as a popular movement lies in 
the way it represents a protest against both ‘Western ideas’, which includes 
the  imposition of neo-liberalism. Gilbert Achcar has argued that neo-liberal 
deregulation has brought about ‘anomisation’ in the developing world; an 
overwhelming level of change which has caused a ‘retrenchment to basic 
identity markers’ (Achcar, 2009) and fundamentalist movements have again 
positioned themselves to benefit from this.  Madigan has made a similar 
point when she notes that in a world of constant change, fundamentalist 
religion satisfies a desire ‘for moral certitude and belonging’ (2011:42).  It 
was in this way that political ideology has come to be re-shaped around 
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antagonistic cultural and civilizational perspectives – the ‘atheist West’ 
against the ‘true faith’ in Islamist and Hindutva forms of fundamentalism.  
This same process was mirrored within the West itself, exemplified by the 
huge influence of Samuel Huntingdon’s writings on ‘The Clash of 
Civilisations’ (1992).  This sense that conflict was now about culture and 
‘values’ was only reinforced following 9/11, the disastrous war of aggression 
against Iraq by US and UK and the subsequent ‘war on terror’.  
As the politics of the Left were substantially weakened by neoliberal 
globalisation in the 1990s and the neo-conservative ‘Project for A New 
American Century’ was busily shaping George Bush’s foreign policy, western 
academia fell into the fervent embrace of postmodernist and postcolonial 
repudiations of the Enlightenment.  As a body of work Postcolonialism was 
inspired by Edward Said’s hugely influential ‘Orientalism’, in which the 
knowledges by which the ‘West’ understood the ‘Orient’ were 
conceptualised as ‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the Orient’ (1990:3).  In place of Mao’s attack on the feudal-
capitalist-patriarchal-religious social order, post-colonial theory railed 
against its ‘four thick ropes’ of the modernist-rational-individual-secularist 
order and the resulting silencing of the subaltern subject.  Secularism and 
universalism and other forms of ‘western imposed’ politics were denounced 
in seminar rooms across the Western academy 2.  One of the most influential 
critics of Enlightenment reason was Michel Foucault, and despite his huge 
popularity and influence, the problems with where this took him politically 
was demonstrated in a series of trips he undertook to Iran on the verge of 
the Khomeini’s Islamic revolution in 1979.  Writing in Le Nouvel Observateur 
in 1978 Foucault waxed eloquent about the ‘political spirituality’ of ‘the 
movement that aims to give a permanent role in political life to the 
traditional structures of Islamic society’ (Foucault, 1978).  One can only say 
that it was fortunate for him that he visited prior to rather than after 
Khomeini’s murderous institutionalisation of those ‘traditional structures’.  
But rather than an isolated piece of poor judgement, this incident was 
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entirely of a piece with the way postmodernism and postcolonialism 
opened the gates to a wave of academic work by academics based in the 
West in which essentialised ‘other-identity’ claims were revered 3.   
      Saba Mahmood’s 2004 book The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and 
the Feminist Subject on the Islamist women’s movements in Egypt was 
emblematic of this shift.  Mahmood began the book describing her journey 
from a feminist politics of the ‘secular-left’ to her ‘realisation’ that as ‘the 
language of Islam has come to apprehend the aspirations of so many people 
around the Muslim world… [We] can no longer arrogantly assume that 
secular forms of life…necessarily exhaust ways of living meaningfully and 
richly in this world’ (2004: xi).  Judith Butler and Foucault offered her the 
theoretical materials for an argument in which Islamist women’s 
movements were uncritically idealised.  Mahmood wrote of the way in 
which the ‘rationalist, self-authorising, transcendental subject presupposed 
by Enlightenment thought in general’ (2004:13) had prevented her from 
realising that the women who joined Islamist movements were not acting 
out of a spirit of ‘deplorable passivity and docility’ but were rather exercising 
‘a form of agency’, and that it would be wrong to ‘treat as natural and 
inimitable only those desires that ensure the emergence of feminist politics’ 
(2004:15).  Indeed there was no doubt that these were women were 
exercising political agency, but to what end?  What is entirely absent 
throughout this book was any discussion of the nature of the Islamist 
political agenda and the impact of these ‘forms of agency’ had in the wider 
polity.  What were the values which informed this agency and what 
practices within the politics of gender resulted from that?  Our objection is 
not to religious forms of agency as such, but surely the key question 
concerns the kind of political project being promoted here.  Indeed as other 
commentators less entranced with Islamic feminism have noted, these 
political movements developed in close parallel with the highly patriarchal 
Islamist groupings run by men who had brought Wahhabi fundamentalism 
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to Egypt from the Gulf states where they had been working (Madigan, 
2011:45).   
 
Mahmood’s book additionally fails to even consider the impact of the 
‘politics of piety’ on secular feminism in Egypt.  Writing of parallel 
developments within Pakistani feminism Afiya Sherbano Zia noted the way 
Islamic feminists there gained credibility by claiming to be ‘reinterpreting 
religious texts in a modern, indigenous, culturally relevant way rather than 
an ‘imposed’ western feminist discourse (2009:38).  However the result of 
this was that: 
…by accommodating the faith-based approach that attempted to look 
for ‘moderate’ alternatives within Islam and insisting on situating the 
debate on the women’s question within Islamic tradition and history, 
such reclamation projects squeezed out and delegitimised the secular 
feminist approach to redefine women’s rights outside the religious 
framework’ (2009:35) 
Islamic feminist discourse based its credibility on the claim that is was 
‘empowering’ women within religious institutions.  While they may well 
have achieved this objective, the result was a form of politics which rejected 
any ‘political confrontation with men, money, mullahs or the military state’ 
(2009:44).  The terrain on which central questions of women’s rights and 
equality were being fought had effectively been theocratized with secular 
voices effectively de-legitimised.  The romance of western based academics 
like Saba Mahmood with ‘Islamic tradition’ thus played a vital role in the 
eclipse of secular feminism, further entrenching fundamentalist religious 
identity and discourse, and failing to grasp what Bhatt has described as: 
. . . the concealment of political interests, groups and parties through dis-
courses of authenticity, discrimination and victimhood which normalise 
what are otherwise quite mendacious political ambitions. (2006: 102) 
The Family, Fundamentalism and the global labour market 
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Fundamentalism promises to restore the family, to put the nation on course 
that aligns it with a divine purpose, and to establish a social order in which 
life can be lived morally, meaningfully and in accord with divine will. 
Helen Hardacre (in Madigan, 2011:39) 
 
Evangelical Demonstration in Columbia, 2016. 
Source: http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37560320    
 
When discussing the emergence of religious fundamentalism above we 
noted an obsessive focus on questions of ‘honour’ and ‘personal morality’ 
with regard to women, demonstrating the way women’s deportment, dress 
and behaviour had become in effect a communal symbol which needed to 
be rigidly policed.   In this section we want to consider why this terrain of 
establishing of moral order around ‘the family’ is so important to 
fundamentalist movements.  This discussion builds on the points we have 
already made about the significance of neoliberal economics in destroying 
forms of life which existed in a state of relative stability for generations 
through the imposition of new capitalist social relations.  In research looking 
at the impact of this for women in developing countries undertaken by the 
International Labour Organisation, Sher Verick has noted that this kind of 
economic development:  
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…has involved two related transitions: the movement of workers from 
agriculture to manufacturing (and more recently services) and the 
migration of people from rural to urban areas. These transitions were 
associated with rising levels of education, declining fertility rates, and 
shifts in other socio-economic drivers of labour force participation, 
with specific implications for the role of women, especially in the labour 
market. Female labour supply is, therefore, both a driver and an 
outcome of development (Verick, 2014). 
As neoliberal globalisation has massively expanded the amount of workers 
involved in production for the global market, proletarianisation of 
traditional peasantries has taken place on a huge scale across the 
developing world.  As Verick notes, this is accompanied by increasing 
involvement of women in wage labour outside the home.  While this pattern 
varies hugely across different regions, we want to argue that these general 
trends are crucial for understanding the terrain on which fundamentalist 
movements are operating, the emotional resonance their arguments have, 
as well as their pre-occupation with circumscribing women’s emergent 
personal freedoms.  The movement from the country to the city described 
in the report above one is of profound and hugely destabilising social 
change.  While large numbers of women previously undertook wage labour 
within the home, as they are drawn into the global labour market in urban 
settings the forms of power exercised in traditional rural patriarchal family 
structures are changed.  Social constraints weaken in the new setting, and 
this enables women to work outside the home and thereby gain access to 
wages and higher levels of personal finances.  As both women and men 
leave the home to work for wages, the nature of the difference between 
male and female roles is diminished and opportunities for women to gain 
greater autonomy emerge.   While men in the family may desire their female 
partners to work in order to increase family income and opportunities for 
their children, they also lose the traditional forms of power they previously 
possessed through that process.4 Fundamentalists interpolate these 
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experiences of change and loss through their call for a return to a divinely 
sanctioned moral order in which men have power and authority in the 
home. Helen Hardacre has characterised the fundamentalist focus on 
gender with the family at the centre is the basis of the fundamentalist 
programme of ‘radical patriarchalism’ (in Madigan, 48-49), but it is crucial 
to understand the way this operates not just ideologically, but through real 
relations at the level of class and gender.  While the fundamentalist appeal 
to men is obvious here, it is important to understand, particularly apropos 
Saba Mahmood’s work, the way this also appeals to women.  Hardacre 
notes that the loss of kinship networks is a key part of huge experiences of 
change experienced, and the loss for women can be greater for women than 
men.  She notes that women are ‘powerfully attracted by fundamentalist 
interpersonal networks that invoke the language of kinship and in which 
religion itself is portrayed as ‘a family’’ (in Madigan, 2011:41). While this 
understanding is valuable, it is important not to invoke the power of 
fundamentalist religion as inevitable here, as there different responses 
which are possible faced with these difficulties.  Fundamentalism, unlike 
trade unionism, socialism or communism, is not concerned with improving 
working conditions, job security or indeed challenging class relations at any 
level for these new members of the global dispossessed.  Its appeal resides 
within the poverty of existing structures, where what is required is a 
‘sacredly ordained’ order where men enforce women’s subjugation.  Daniel 
Bensaid has been one of few Marxists to grasp that it was the Left’s failure 
to thoroughly understand the changing nature of class relations that gave 
fundamentalists the opportunity to occupy territory which had once 
belonged to the Left.  As he noted ‘the hasty ‘farewells to the proletariat’ 
are not just the expression of a risky sociological analysis.  They also 
contribute to a political and moral debacle.  On the ruins of class solidarity 
what flourish are identitarian panics, the herd instinct, myths of origins, 
sects and tribes’ (2015:207).  Fundamentalist neo-patriarchy in this sense is 
the price paid for the absence of a politics of class solidarity.   
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Conclusion: Reclaiming Secular Space 
‘My dream is to be able to live in a country where I can say everything in 
public without people trying to kill me’  
Atheist Blogger – Bangladesh (‘Islam’s Non-Believers’ 2016) 
What we have sought to delineate in this discussion is the crucial 
importance of the term ‘religious fundamentalism’ as an analytical category 
which allows us to link together a series of related developments taking 
place across and within major world religions.  Women in particular are in 
the firing line when it comes the introduction of these measures as control 
of women’s minds and bodies are central to the neo-patriarchal order that 
fundamentalists group seek to construct.  We have sought to outline the 
way fundamentalist movements are entirely a product of modernity and 
that their appeal is not simply to people’s ignorance or backwardness but 
rather operates on a concrete material level.  This concerns a range of 
related factors; the destabilising impact of neoliberal globalisation and the 
destruction of social bonds which results from that, the retrenchment of 
state based social provision, and the decline of socialist, social democratic 
and communist political parties who had historically fought for the interests 
and rights of the working class and poor.  Now occupying a significant 
degree of this terrain, fundamentalists groups and parties have 
demonstrated their capacity to operate both within the state, as an adjunct 
to the state, but also in opposition to the state, whether in the form of 
institutionalised opposition parties and movements, as well as in 
paramilitary organisations.  
In seeking to understand and characterise the conquest of secular 
space by religious fundamentalism, our intention is not to imply that this is 
unable to be resisted.  Indeed the work of writers like Karima Bennoune 
(2013) demonstrates the global nature of resistance which is taking place to 
religious fundamentalism.   Despite the enormous growth of the various 
forms of fundamentalism since the 1980s in particular, it is essential to 
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envisage and articulate a different life from the non-future offered by 
neoliberal capitalism on one hand and fundamentalism on the other.    The 
basely punitive nature of fundamentalism puritanism and the hateful 
violence of its authoritarianism mean that these movements inherently 
generate resistance.  But this is a resistance that has to be built in different 
ways.  At the level of ideas we have argued it is absolutely essential that 
people pull themselves out of the quagmire of postmodernist cultural 
relativism that has been so helpful in legitimising fundamentalism and 
preventing the articulation of that alternative future. But first and foremost 
this alternative will be built at the directly practical and organisational level, 
as part of anti-fundamentalist initiatives in support of women’s rights, the 
rights of religious and sexual minorities, as well as the right of people to exit 
religion altogether. 
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Notes 
1 We want to distinguish here between religious institutions offering support to 
poor communities as an aspect of charitable work and this same process as part of 
a concerted strategy used by fundamentalists.  Whilst in some cases these activities 
can be clearly distinguished, in others this can be a difficult line to draw, such as 
where religious charitable involvement requires adherence to regressive mores 
which can slide over into fundamentalism.  At the same time it is crucial to 
acknowledge that in many crisis zones in the world, religious institutions do 
provide goods and services that are much needed, and in the absence of 
functioning state support, this can be the only thing on offer. 
2 It is important to note views on the Left at this time were not uncritically 
supportive of the Enlightenment.  Indeed one of the most important works which 
sought to address these came from the Frankfurt School marxists Adorno and 
Horkheimer.  Their work ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’, originally published in 1944, 
argues that while ‘social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought’ 
(1997:xiii) equally it is wrong to assume that Enlightenment reason would 
unequivocally and inevtiably usher in social progress and emancipation.  The rise 
of Nazi antisemitism is central to their analysis and showed that virulent forms of 
hatred of ‘the other’ could co-exist with versions of Reason. They particularly saw 
the dangers of an omnipotent view of ‘science’ whose truth ame to be seen as 
entirely disconnected from society.  Unfortunately these powerfully insightful 
understandings of the Enlightenment from the within the Left have been almost 
entirely passed over within postmodern and postcolonial writings, which have 
rejected the Enlightenment tout court.  
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3 Indeed as the work of Afary and Anderson has demonstrated, Foucault himself 
was challenged on exactly this issue by ‘Atoussa H, an Iranian feminist living in 
France.  In a letter published in Le Novel Observateur on 6/11/78 she wrote ‘I am 
profoundly upset by the untroubled attitude of French leftists toward the 
possibility of an ‘Islamic government’ that might replace the bloody tyranny of the 
Shah…After twenty five years of silence and oppression, do the Iranian people have 
no other choice between Savak and religious fanaticism?...Today, unveiled women 
are often insulted and young men do not hide the fact that, in the regime they wish 
for, women should behave or else be punished’ (in Afary and Anderson, 2010:209).  
Foucault responded suggesting that Atoussia H’s approach was ‘intolerable’, 
attacking her for ‘merging together all the respects, all the forms, and all the 
potentialities of Islam within a single expression of contempt, for the sake of 
rejecting them entirely under the thousand year old reproach of ‘fanaticism’’ 
(Afary & Anderson:210).  One can only comment how prophetic this exchange was, 
both in terms of the arrogance of Foucault’s refusal to listen to the concerns raised 
by Atoussia H., which have been entirely vindicated, but also what has happened 
subsequently in terms of way women criticising Islamic fundamentalism are so 
frequently dismissed as ‘Islamaphobic’ (see Bennoune 2013)       
4 The research of Ekeoba et al (2016) offers evidence in the Nigerian context men 
of men being generally positive about their wives and female partners working 
outside the home, but only as long as this does not alter power relations in the 
home.  
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